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Abstract
We formally investigate the relationships between several models that are widely used in protocol veriﬁcation, namely
variants of the inductive model of message traces inspired by Paulson’s approach, and models based on rewriting. More
precisely, we prove several over-approximation relationships between models, i.e. that one model allows strictly more traces
or reachable states than the other. This is common in veriﬁcation: often an over-approximation is easier to prove correct
than the original model, and proving that the over-approximation is safe implies that the original model is safe—provided
that the models are indeed in an over-approximation relation. We then show that some over-approximations are not sound
with respect to a common formalization of authentication goals based on exchanged messages. The precise formal account
that we give on the relation of the models allows us to correct the situation.
© 2007 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Security protocols have been intensively studied using formalmethods in the past 25 years, and a large variety
of formalisms, models, and techniques have been developed in order to cope with the different kinds of inﬁnity
that arise in veriﬁcation. Most notably, there is no bound on the number of sessions (protocol runs) that can
be executed in parallel, and there are inﬁnitely many messages an intruder can construct from what he has
observed on the network, even assuming that he cannot break the cryptography. The variety of different models
results in a number of problems: it is hard to tell whether the statements proved by different veriﬁcation tools
are equivalent, how tools can be combined, and whether a particular meta-argument about one model (e.g. that
certain restrictions are without loss of generality) can be carried over to other models.
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Fig. 1. Roadmap of the considered protocol models and their relationships.
In this paper, we consider the relationships between variants of two widely used models. The ﬁrst model
is based on set rewriting, which is for instance employed as the input language for the veriﬁcation tools that
are part of the AVISPA tool [1], the CAPSL framework [2] and [3]. The second model is inspired by Paulson’s
approach of message traces based on the Isabelle theorem prover [4]. This latter model has inﬂuenced a number
of automated veriﬁcation approaches as discussed below.
Although we consider two particular models, the ideas presented in this paper are general. There are several
works that prove the equivalence of models in different formalisms [5,6] and that certain restrictions in models
are without loss of generality [7]. However, it is not the focus of this paper to discuss all design choices and to
compare with all existing formalisms. Rather we want to point out that most current protocol models follow
the same basic idea as our set rewriting model: the protocol is a set of processes (the honest agents) each of
which has a local state that is updated when receiving a message and sending an answer, and these processes
are connected via an intruder-controlled network. We thus see the set rewriting approach as a representative of
the “standard” way to model protocols. In contrast, the message trace model has no explicit notion of processes
or local states; rather we have rules that tell us how a given trace of exchanged messages can be extended with
further messages.
The focus of this work is on the over-approximation relationship between two models, i.e. when one model
allows strictly more traces or reachable states than the other. Over-approximations can induce attacks that are
false positives, i.e. attacks that work only in the over-approximated model, but not in the original model. The
false positives are thus in some sense artifacts created by the over-approximation. For falsiﬁcation (i.e. detecting
attacks) this is problematic, as the “real” attacks may be buried under false positives. On the other hand, for
veriﬁcation (i.e. trying to prove a protocol correct) over-approximation does make sense: given a precise model
and an over-approximation of it, proving that the over-approximation is safe is often much easier than in the
original model and implies that the precise model is safe as well.
Our contributions are as follows (see also Fig. 1): We formally prove that the message trace model  is an
over-approximation of the set rewritingmodel, i.e. it contains traces that have no counter-part in the set rewrit-
ing model (or in reality), while conversely all reachable states of the set rewriting model have their counter-part
in the message trace model. Moreover, we show that a certain variant  of the set rewriting model is equivalent
to the message trace model in a sense that is made precise in this paper, yielding a precise understanding of the
relationship between the two models. This relation has never been expressed in the literature before.
We further show how the over-approximations inherent in  and  can be used to abstract away a large part
of the control structure of protocols, and this control abstraction is the basis of many automated veriﬁcation
approaches [8,9,10,11, 12,13,14]. We formally prove that the resulting models  and  are over-approximations
of the message trace model, a fact which has also never been formally analyzed before.
These relationships yield a better understanding of these models and their inherent over-approximations.
While it is immediate that the over-approximations of the different models are sound for reasoning about
secrecy, it turns out that they are not sound in general for a common formulation of authentication goals based
on messages, i.e. a protocol may have an authentication ﬂaw in the set rewriting model, but be correct in the
over-approximation. The discovery of this subtlety results from the rigid formal study of the models and their
relationships. We give an alternative formalization of authentication goals based on special events in protocol
execution and show that the over-approximation is sound with respect to this formulation. We also show how
to soundly encode authentication goals (based on data abstraction) in the models  and .
The work closest related to ours is [15] which considers two models similar to  and  and shows that every
attack against secrecy in the original model can be recast in the over-approximation. It does not examine, how-
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ever, all the relationships between models as we do, and does not consider authentication goals. Also, several
papers like [16] deal with the safe over-approximation by data abstraction, which is however orthogonal to this
paper.
Fig. 1 gives an overview of the protocol models we consider and the theorems about their relationships. We
proceed as follows: after summarizing preliminaries in Section 2, we deﬁne the set rewriting model and the mes-
sage trace model in Section 3. In Section 4 we formally show that the message trace model over-approximates
the set rewriting model. In Section 5 we show how to use the over-approximation to perform a complete control
abstraction. In Section 6 we consider the speciﬁcation of security goals for the protocols in the different models,
based on our results about their relationships. In Section 7 we conclude with a summary and an outlook on
future work.
2. Preliminaries
The models we consider are all based on the standard intruder model by Dolev and Yao [17], where honest
agents communicate over a hostile network controlled by a dishonest party, the intruder, and where the cryptog-
raphy is assumed to be perfect, i.e. the intruder can decrypt an encryptedmessage only if he knows the proper key.
2.1. Messages as terms
Messages are modeled as terms, where agent names, atomic keys and nonces are represented by constants
and all (cryptographic) operations are represented by function symbols. For instance, {m}k represents the asym-
metric encryption of message m with key k . The pair of the messages m1 and m2 is written as m1,m2. Note that
the pairing operator is not associative, although the notation may suggest so. Rather, m1,m2,m3 stands for
m1, (m2,m3). We introduce other symbols when needed below. Throughout this paper,  denotes a countably
inﬁnite set of constant and function symbols, and 0 ⊆  are the constant symbols, where i ∈ 0 denotes the
intruder. We assume that there is a distinguished subset ′0 of 0 for the creation of fresh data. V denotes a
countable set of variable symbols disjoint from . By convention, variable symbols of the term algebra begin
with an upper-case letter and constant and function symbols with lower case letters. (This does not hold for
the meta-variables.) The set of terms built from  and a set V ⊆ V is denoted by T(V), and we write T for
V = ∅, and call it the set of ground terms. T(V) is a -algebra, usually called the free term-algebra. This means
that any two terms t1 and t2 are interpreted equally in this algebra, denoted ≈, iff they are syntactically equal,
e.g. {m}k ≈ {m′}k ′ iff k ≈ k ′ and m ≈ m′. This reﬂects one aspect of the perfect cryptography assumption. The
free-algebra interpretation of terms is standard in the formal analysis of security protocols, and except for the
set rewriting operator introduced below, we stick with this assumption. We also use other standard concepts
like substitution and matching, see e.g. [18].
2.2. Dolev–Yao intruder deduction
As it is standard, we inductively deﬁne the set of messages an intruder can deduce from a given set of ground
messages IK (“intruder knowledge”) as the least set that contains IK and that is closed under a number of rules,
and denote it by DY(IK). For instance, using a unary symbol k−1 to denote the private key corresponding to








Depending on the set of cryptographic operators, there may be other similar rules. Throughout this paper,
we consider a ﬁxed deduction relation DY . We assume that the reader is familiar with these kinds of inductive
deﬁnitions, see e.g. [19]; in particular, note that the least closure is uniquely deﬁned. For DY , using the least
closure reﬂects the central aspect of the perfect cryptography assumption: the intruder cannot perform any
deduction steps except those explicitly given by these rules.
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2.3. Set rewriting
A rewrite rule with fresh constants has the form l=[V ]⇒r for two terms l and r and a set of variables V , such
that vars(l) ∩ V = ∅ and vars(l) ∪ V ⊇ vars(r). (vars(t) denotes the set of variable symbols that occur in t.) If
V = ∅, we simply write l ⇒ r. The intuition is the following: given a term t, if a subterm matches the left-hand
side of the rewrite rule, we can replace this occurrence with the right-hand side; each variable of the set V is
replaced with a fresh constant (that does not appear in t) during the transition. This mechanism is used to create
fresh constants during protocol execution. More formally, a set of rewrite rules R induces a rewrite relation →R
on terms as follows: t →R s iff there is a rule l=[V ]⇒r ∈ R, a position p in t and a substitution  such that t at
position p is equivalent to l,  maps each variable of V to a different constant in ′0 that does not occur in t,
and s is obtained from t by replacing the subterm of t at position p with r. Note that if t is a ground term, then
so are l, r and s. For set rewriting we assume an operator “.” that is associative, commutative, and idempotent
(ACI). These properties can be expressed by a set of equations modulo which terms are interpreted.1 We use
this operator to represent a ﬁnite set of terms itself as a term, e.g. the set {1, 2, 3} is represented by the term 1.2.3 .
We will refer to such “set terms” directly as sets in this paper. Using such sets, we deﬁne state transition systems
as follows. Every state is a ﬁnite set, composed by “.”, of facts that hold in this state. Each fact is expressed by
ground terms of T, e.g. we use the fact symbol iknows (m) to denote that the intruder knows the message m.
Transitions from state to state are expressed by rewrite rules containing the “.” operator. For instance the rule
iknows (M).iknows (K) ⇒ iknows (M).iknows (K).iknows ({M }K)
can be applied to any state, which contains a subset of facts that match with iknows (M) and iknows (K). (This
can even be the same fact if M = K holds for the matching substitution .) This matched subset is replaced
with the set of facts of the right-hand side under the matching substitution. Therefore, the example rule adds the
encryptedmessage {M }K to the intruder knowledge. By repeating the left-hand side facts on the right-hand side,
we achieve the effect that the intruder knowledge can only increase. Since we will not have any rules where pieces
of intruder knowledge are removed, we deﬁne the following syntactic sugar: for the special case of iknows (·)
facts, every left-hand side occurrence is implicitly repeated on the right-hand side, so we do not have to repeat
it explicitly. Thus we may write the above example rule simply as
iknows (M).iknows (K) ⇒ iknows ({M }K) .
3. Models based on set rewriting and message traces
In order to be able to make a formal comparison of models, we must have a common basis for describing
protocols. We choose a simple strand-space style formalism, called message patterns. This limits the class of
protocols we can consider, but makes the presentation much easier.
3.1. Message patterns
Themessage pattern description of a protocol is given by a ﬁnite, non-empty set of role namesR1, . . . ,Rr and
for every role R a ﬁnite, non-empty list of message terms of T(V), denoted by mR0 , . . . ,mRn . We denote the last
index n by last
R
and require that it is even. We also require that for every role R, the term mR0 is a non-empty
concatenation of variables built with the pair operator. This term will later be instantiated with agent names,
and the ﬁrst component is the agent playing the R. We thus denote with player (m) the ﬁrst component of the
message m when m is an instance of mR0 . We assume that none of the constants of 
′
0 (which are reserved for
fresh data creation) are contained in the protocol description.
1 The often consideredmulti-set rewriting requires only anACoperator, which is technically simpler while set rewriting leads to a smoother
formalization.
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Fig. 2. Example of message sequences: the Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol with Lowe’s ﬁx (NSL).
The message terms with an odd index stand for incoming messages, the ones with even index greater than
0 stand for the outgoing messages. Intuitively, variables that ﬁrst appear in mRi , i.e. not in mR0 , . . . ,m
R
i−1, are
learned if i is of odd index, and freshly created, if i is of even index greater then 0. The function fresh
R
n =
vars(mRn ) \ (vars(mR0 ) ∪ . . . ∪ vars(mRn−1)) abbreviates the set of fresh variables. Note that we do not require
that the combination of the rules yields a meaningful protocol.
Example 1.The canonical example of the Needham-Schroeder Public Key Protocol with Lowe’s ﬁx (NSL)
can be described by the message pattern sequences displayed in Fig. 2. The layout is arranged so that cor-
responding messages of different roles are on the same line. Since role A is starting the protocol, the ﬁrst
incoming message is the dummy message start ; similarly, as B has no outgoing message in the last step,
we have here the dummy message end . These two dummy messages make the rest of the formalization
uniform as we do not have to consider special cases for the ﬁrst and last message. During the protocol
execution, A freshly creates the nonce NA (since the ﬁrst appearance of NA in any of A’s messages is
outgoing) and learns two values PKB and NB (since these variables ﬁrst appear in incoming messages
for role A).
Observe that themessage termsmS2 andm
A
3 are identical except for the subtermsPKB and pk(B), respectively.
This reﬂects the fact that S knows everybody’s public key, but A does not. Thus A would accept any message
at the position of PKA and use it in subsequent communication. A only knows her own public/private key-pair
and the public key of S . In fact, the private key of A is never explicitly used, but it is implicitly used, since A
expects to receive a message encrypted with its public key in mA5 .
In some cases, it is necessary to limit the set of agents that can play a certain role, for instance the server
in the NSL protocol cannot be the intruder (otherwise the protocol could not guarantee anything). Thus, the
protocol description also includes a predicate inst R(m) which says whether m is an allowed instance of mR0 . We
assume that the set of m with inst R(m) is ﬁnite for every role (otherwise Theorem 3 would not hold), which
means that the set of agents who can participate in protocol runs is ﬁnite; however, we do not limit the number
of protocol runs. The restriction to a ﬁnite number of agents can be justiﬁed as in [7] by identifying the names
of honest agents in different protocol runs. Finally, we assume a ﬁnite set of ground messages IK0 associated
with the protocol, representing the initial knowledge of the intruder. For the example of the NSL protocol, let
IK0 = {i, pk(i), pk(i)−1, s, pk(s), start }.
Since we never considermore than one protocol at a time, we consider an arbitrary but ﬁxed protocol descrip-
tion (consisting of the message patterns, initial intruder knowledge and allowed instantiations) for the rest of
this paper, in order to avoid indexing everything with the protocol description. The formalization of goals for
a protocol is addressed in Section 6, when the relationship of the models is clear. In the comparison of models,
we focus on what the intruder can deduce and a notion of the state of honest agents.
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Fig. 3. The set rewriting model. Note that iknows(·) facts on a left-hand side are implicitly also present on the right-hand side.
3.2. The set rewriting model
Fig. 3 deﬁnes the set rewriting model by an initial state and a set of set rewrite rule schemata (i.e. rules that
are parameterized over the protocol description). Fig. 5 gives an example of a set rewriting rule for the NSL
protocol.
• The initial state for the set rewriting model consisting of an iknows (·) fact for every message that the intruder
initially knows.
• The ﬁrst rule schema (which has no left-hand side and can therefore be applied to any state) describes the
creation of a new protocol run: for every role and for every permitted instantiation of the agent names of
that role, we can create a new local state of an agent. Using this rule, we can create an unbounded number of
parallel executions of the protocol. The binary fact symbol stateR(m) represents the local state of an agent
in the execution of the protocol in R; the information that the agent has gathered so far is a concatenation
of the instantiations (i.e. his own name and maybe other predetermined agents) and the messages he has sent
and received up to now.
• The next rule schema describes the transitions of honest agents: when an agent is at the stage to have sent the
message n− 2 of his role description, and receives message n− 1 from the network (i.e. the intruder), then he
can answer with message n to the network (i.e. the intruder) and update his local state by adding messages
n− 1 and n. (Recall that the state-fact of the left-hand side is removed, while the iknows-fact remains due
to the syntactic sugar we have deﬁned.) Also, in such a transition all fresh variables (fresh
R
n ) are substituted
with constants that have not occurred so far.
• The last rule schema directly expresses the deduction rules of the intruder.
We now inductively deﬁne the set of reachable states  as the least set of states that includes the initial state and
that is closed under the →R relation induced by the rules.
The reader may wonder whether there can be a problem due to the fact that in set rewriting we cannot have
multiple identical state-facts. However, we can at any time use the initialization rule to obtain the initial state
facts, and from there repeat any execution we had before up to the point where the agent creates fresh data for
the ﬁrst time. From that point on, the state facts are already different due to the fresh data. This argumentation
allows us to work without session identiﬁers.
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Fig. 4. The message trace model.
3.3. The message trace model
The message trace model characterizes the protocol by a set of traces  that is deﬁned as the least set closed
under the rules in Fig. 4. Fig. 5 shows an example of a rule in the message trace model for the NSL protocol.
A trace is a ﬁnite sequence of events. In our model, there are two kinds of events, namely snda(m) and rcva(m),
where a is a constant and m is a ground term, representing that agent a sends or receives the message m. The
ﬁrst rule simply says that the empty trace <> is in . The second rule formalizes that the intruder can see all
sent messages on the network, and that all messages, which any agent A receives, are chosen by the intruder
from the set of messages he can deduce from what he has seen on the network. We allow as an agent name any
constant of 0 \′0 since there is no notion of typing. Recall that ′0 is the distinguished subset of 0 reserved
for creating fresh data. The symbol “:” represents concatenating an event to a trace, and [t] gives the set of
events of a trace. To describe the behavior of honest agents, we have a rule for each role R and suitable index n:
if a trace containing all send and receive events up to point n in the protocol execution of role R, then the trace
can be extended by the next send event of R. Here, used(t) is the set of constants that occur in any message of
trace t. This formalization is close to the one of [4], but there are some differences.
One difference concerns the typing of messages. Many approaches such as Paulson’s use a typed model which
roughly means a limitation on the set of values that may be substituted for the variables of the transition rules.
For instance one may specify in a typed model that the variable A may only be substituted with terms that
are of type “agent”. Our results are independent from the question of typing, as long as we consider identical
restrictions on variables in all protocol models.
The second difference is that [4] uses a combination of send and receive events, denoted a → b : m, which at
ﬁrst sight looks like a synchronous communication model (where, in particular, the intruder cannot intercept
messages), but this is not the case. In recent works, similar events as in our model are used, called Says and Gets
[20].
There are further minor differences: in [4], there are two functions synth and analz that represent each a part
of the DY closure, namely the synthesis and analysis rules, and instead of DY(IK) the closure synth(analz(IK))
is employed, which in general is a proper subset of DY(IK) [21]. We thus use the complete DY(IK). Also, the
way we use the set of permitted instances of agent names is not present in the rules of [4]; this is due to our
generalization to arbitrary protocols that can be speciﬁed by message patterns, while for a concrete protocol,
such checks are not necessary in every rule.
4. The over-approximation and persistent set rewriting
The intuition about why the models are so similar is that every state fact of the set rewriting model in some
way corresponds to the respective send and receive events in themessage tracemodel.We formalize this intuition
by a function [[·]] that maps a state fact to a set of events:
[[stateA(m0, . . . ,mn)]] = {rcvA(m1), sndA(m2), . . . , rcvA(mn−1), sndA(mn)} ,
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Fig. 5. Example of the different models: the second transition rule of role B in NSL.
Fig. 6. A trace of NSL demonstrating the over-approximation.
where A = player (m0). Intuitively the other components of m0 will later be reﬂected by the additional condition
inst R(m0) which is not an event. This mapping, together with conditions on the intruder-deducible messages,
is the basis for comparing two models, namely to prove inclusions between models and equivalences between
models.
We now discuss an aspect that is inherent in the message trace model. We observe that in all rules we have
only positive conditions on the existence of events on a given trace, with the exception of the creation of fresh
data. For instance, the NSL example of Fig. 2 allows the trace shown in Fig. 6 which demonstrates the over-
approximation. For brevity, we have omitted the steps with the server S , and also used the a → b : m notation
to abbreviate the two events snda(m) and rcvb(m); moreover, we have labeled these events with step numbers of
the protocol (as meant by the sender) and distinguished “different” sessions using primed labels. In this trace,
we have one normal execution of the protocol (steps 1–3). But then in step 2′, b chooses to react a second time
to the ﬁrst message of a. This is because there is nothing in the rule for B that says that he may not react to a
message, to which he has already reacted. Even worse, at this point he has already received an answer to his ﬁrst
reaction, so in fact the session should already be over at this point. However, b chooses the fresh nonce n3 which
he links with a’s ﬁrst nonce n1, so from his point of view there are two different sessions, although a has only
sent one message. Now in step 3′ agent a reacts to b’s second reply to the initial message from a—observe that
both step 2 and step 2′ contain the same nonce n1. This means that a does not “remember” that the nonce n1 is
already used and that it should rather not accept messages with this nonce anymore. Finally, a sends in step 3′′
another reply to step 2.
More generally, this phenomenon stems from the fact that there is no notion of local state of the agents in
the message trace model—all “memory” that agents have in this model lies in the messages exchanged. Basically
that would be enough to reconstruct each agent’s local state, however, that would require negative conditions
in the inductive rules of the message trace model, in order to express that certain events have not yet occurred.
In the case of the NSL, this phenomenon does not seem to be a problem—as far as secrecy and certain forms
of authentication are concerned. However, injective agreement as deﬁned by [22], which additionally checks for
replay of messages, is trivially violated for every protocol in this model, since every agent is willing to accept
incoming messages of the correct format any number of times. This issue is discussed in Section 6. Similarly,
many protocols cannot be reasonablymodeled with this message trace basedmodel. As an example, the contract
signing protocol ASW [23] involves a trusted third party (TTP) which is contacted in case of a dispute. Without
going into the details of this protocol, the TTP can give out abort tokens or replacement contracts, and it is
essential that the TTP never gives out a replacement contract for a (partial) session that it has already aborted.
Thus the steps of the TTP can only be performed if certain events have not yet occurred, and the protocol has
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trivial false positives otherwise. It should be noted that the formalization of this protocol (see for instance [24])
is beyond the scope of the message sequence speciﬁcation we have introduced in Section 3.
Thus, due to the over-approximation, for a given protocol and goal, we might not be able to prove in the
message trace model that the protocol fulﬁlls the goal, even if that is the case in a more precise (in terms of
approximation) model. In contrast, if we can show that the protocol fulﬁlls its goals in the over-approximation,
then it does so also in the concrete model, as we will show below for several goals. It is thus to show that the
message trace model is indeed an over-approximation—in a sense that we will now make precise—of the set
rewriting model.
4.1. Persistent set rewriting
Weﬁrst show that there is an over-approximation of the set rewritingmodel, the persistent set rewritingmodel,
which in turn is over-approximated by the message trace model. The advantage of taking this little detour via
persistent rewriting is a precise understanding of the relationships of the models.
Intuitively, the phenomenon just described can be understood as follows: in every transition, an agent forks
into two incarnations: one incarnation learns the new incoming message, and creates and remembers the out-
going message of this step. The other incarnation just remains in the state it is, to later possibly spawn further
incarnations from exactly this local state. Proving formally the inclusion relationships, we can formalize this
intuition via the persistent set rewriting model.
For the persistent set rewriting model, we change the honest agent rules of the set rewriting model as follows:
every state fact of the left-hand side is also repeated on the right-hand side, formalizing that one incarnation of
the agent remains in its present state. The honest agents rules thus look as follows:





=[freshRn ]⇒iknows (mRn ).stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn−2).stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn )
Note that this is the same construction that we have already implicitly deﬁned for the iknows-facts. Now all
facts contained in a state are also contained in all successor states, hence the name “persistent”. We denote the
reachable states of the persistent set rewriting model as .
4.2. Relation to set rewriting
We ﬁrst show that the persistent set rewriting model is indeed an over-approximation of the set rewriting
model, in the sense that every reachable state of  is subsumed by one in . To this end, we extend the deﬁnition
of DY(·) to a set of facts s, namely DY(s) = DY({m | iknows (m) ∈ s}).
Theorem 1. For every reachable state s ∈ , there is a reachable state s′ ∈  such that s ⊆ s′ and DY(s) = DY(s′).
Proof . This is shown by structural induction, where we have to slightly strengthen the induction hypothesis in
that corresponding states s and s′ have the same set of used fresh identiﬁers (i.e. constants from ′0).
As the induction basis, observe that the initial states are identical in both models. For the induction step, con-
sider a reachable state s of the set rewriting model, a transition rule LHS=[V ]⇒RHS of the set rewriting model
and a substitution  such that LHS ⊆ s. (Note that  also assigns values to the fresh data in V .) The induction
hypothesis is that there is a state s′ ⊇ s reachable in the persistent set rewriting model such thatDY(s) = DY(s′)
and s and s′ have the same set of fresh constants used.
We show that for the successor state t = (s \ LHS) ∪ RHS in the set rewritingmodel, there is a correspond-
ing state t′ ⊇ t reachable in one transition from s′ the persistent set rewriting model. We use the corresponding
rule in the persistent set rewriting model, which is LHS=[V ]⇒LHS .RHS . This rule is applicable to s′ with the
same substitution , since s′ ⊇ s ⊇ LHS and s and s′ use the same set of fresh constants from′0. The resulting
new state is
t′ = (s′ \ LHS) ∪ LHS ∪ RHS = s′ ∪ RHS ⊇ s ∪ RHS ⊇ t ,
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It also follows that s′ and t′ still use the same set of fresh constants. To see that t and t′ have the same intruder
knowledge, observe that DY(IK 1 ∪ IK2) = DY(DY(IK 1) ∪ IK2) for all sets IK 1 and IK2 of messages, since DY
is a closure operation. Now we have that
DY(t′) = DY(s′ ∪ RHS) = DY(DY(s′) ∪ RHS) = DY(DY(s) ∪ RHS)
= DY(s ∪ RHS) = DY((s \ LHS) ∪ RHS) = DY(t) ,
wherewehaveused that iknows (·) facts are implicitlypersistent and thus {m | iknows (m) ∈ s} ⊆ {m | iknows (m) ∈
(s \ LHS) ∪ RHS}. 
This implies, in particular, that for every reachable state s in the set rewriting model, there is a state s′ in the
persistent set rewriting model, such that the set of messages the intruder can derive in s′ is at least as large as in
s, and that every state fact of s is contained in s′.
4.3. Inclusion in the inductive message trace model
The next step is to show that the persistent set rewriting model is in a sense subsumed in the message trace
model. We do this with respect to the intruder knowledge and the local states of honest agents as formalized by
the [[·]] function. Also, we extend the deﬁnition of DY(·) to a set of events E, namely DY(E) = DY(IK0 ∪ {m |
snd_ (m) ∈ [t]}), given the initial intruder knowledge IK0 attached to a protocol.
Theorem 2. For every reachable state s ∈ , there is a trace t ∈  such that DY(s) = DY([t]) and for every state
fact f ∈ s, [[f ]] ⊆ [t].
Proof . We use again structural induction, in this case on the inductive structure of , and again we strengthen
the induction hypothesis so that the states s and the trace t in question use the same set fresh constants from′0.
Induction Basis. For the initial state of the persistent set rewriting model and the empty trace <>∈  fulﬁlls
the hypothesis, as there are no state facts in the initial state (and thus no send and receive events need to be on
the trace), there are no fresh data and what the intruder can derive is DY(IK0) for both the initial state and the
empty trace.
Induction Step. Given any reachable state s ∈  and a trace t ∈  that corresponds to s in the sense of the
induction hypothesis. We show that for every state s′ reachable from s by one application of a rewrite rule, we
can ﬁnd an extension t′ of t in  that fulﬁlls the induction hypothesis.
Consider any transition rule applicable to s and the successor state s′, as well as a trace t that corresponds to
s according to the induction hypothesis; we distinguish three cases, one for each kind of rule:
(1) The rule is an initialization rule, i.e. of the form ⇒ stateR(m) such that inst R(m) holds. This rule neither
creates fresh data nor increases the intruder knowledge.m is a ground instance ofmR0 , thus [[stateR(m)]] =∅ ⊆ [t]. Therefore, t already satisﬁes the induction hypothesis.
(2) The rule is an intruder rule. Then the effect of the rule is the addition (if not yet present) of a fact iknows (m)
for some message m ∈ DY(s). Thus, DY(s′) = DY(s) = DY([t]). Further, no fresh data and no state facts
are added. Thus, t satisﬁes the induction hypothesis with respect to s′.
(3) The rule is an honest agent state transition rule, i.e. of the form





=[freshRn ]⇒iknows (mRn ).stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn−2).stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn ) ,
for some R and 0 < n  last R. Let  be a substitution under which the rule is applied (including the
values for fresh
R
n ). It follows that m
R
n−1 ∈ DY(s) = DY(t). Thus, we can apply the intruder rule of the
message trace model to obtain the trace t′ = rcva(mRn ) : t ∈  where a = player (mR0 ). Note that t and
t′ have the same intruder knowledge and use the same set of fresh constants. Thus, freshRn  are constants
that are not yet used in t′. From the construction, it follows that inst R(mR0 ). By the induction hypoth-
esis, [[stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn−2)]] = {rcva(mR1 ), snda(mR1 ), . . . , snda(mRn−2)} ⊆ [t] ⊆ [t′]. This gives us all
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premises in order to apply the corresponding inductive rule of the message trace model to t′, yielding the
trace t′′ = snda(mRn ) : t′ ∈ . t′′ uses the same amount of fresh data as s′, moreover for the new state fact
of s′ we have
[[stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn )]] =
[[stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn−2)]] ∪ {rcva(mRn−1), snda(mRn )} ⊆ [t′′] .
For the intruder knowledge we have
DY(s′) = DY(s ∪ {iknows (mRn )}) = DY([t] ∪ {snda(mRn )}) = DY(t′′) .
Thus, t′′ ∈  corresponds to s′ in the sense of the induction hypothesis. 
This shows that  is an over-approximation of  in the sense we have deﬁned. One may wonder whether the 
andmodel are even equivalent in this sense, i.e. whether conversely all traces in themodel have a counter-part
in the  model via the [[·]] function. This is not the case in general as we will later see in Section 6.2. Thus  is a
strict over-approximation of themodel (which itself is a strict over-approximation of themodel). Intuitively,
from  to  we relax the control structure by allowing the agents to react arbitrarily often to partial executions
of the protocol. From  to  we abstract further on the control structure and allow agents to interpret arbitrary
subsets of messages (that may have been said in another context) as belonging to the same session.
5. Reachable facts and events
In the previous section, we have shown that a large part of the control structure of protocols is abstracted
away in the  and  models, namely the order in which events have occurred does not play any role and the
set of reached local states of honest agents grows monotonically. An obvious idea might thus be to simplify
matters further by considering the set of reachable facts  =⋃s∈ s and the set of reachable events  =
⋃
t∈[t].
This drastically simpliﬁes many search problems, as instead of searching an inﬁnite state space, we merge all
states into one set of reachable facts. This set is ﬁnite under certain conditions, namely when both the intruder
is restricted by a typed model to ﬁnitely many messages and data abstraction is performed, as discussed below.
However, there are two problems related to this. Firstly, authentication goals cannot be formalized in the
usual way anymore as we discuss in Section 6. Secondly, the fresh data in every state or trace is chosen based
on what has not yet been used. Collecting facts and events from different traces would give a kind of collision,
e.g. the fresh data in a session between an honest agent and the intruder (which the intruder may know) and the
fresh data in a session between honest agents (which the intruder may not know) can be identical. This renders
the  and  models useless for protocols with fresh data.
Another view on this is the following: both  and  are inductively deﬁned. Usually, all rules of an inductive
deﬁnition aremonotonic in the sense that a rule is applicable to a set S , then it is also applicable to any superset of
S . This guarantees that the ﬁxed-point, i.e. the least set closed under the rules, is uniquely deﬁned. If one instead
uses an inductive deﬁnition of the set of reachable facts and events, then there is the problem of the negative
condition that fresh data are constants not used so far. Leaving out this condition renders the model useless
(as every protocol will then have trivial attacks). Including the condition, however, leads to non-monotonic
induction rules and the ﬁxed-point is in this case not uniquely deﬁned, but rather depends on the order in which
the inductive rules have been applied.
However, in many automated veriﬁcation approaches, a kind of data abstraction is performed [8,9,10,11, 12,
13,14]—inspired by the idea of abstract interpretation [25]. The idea is the following: if we map the inﬁnite set of
(fresh) data to ﬁnitely many equivalence classes and instead of each concrete datum rather consider its abstract
equivalence class, many search spaces become ﬁnite and the abstract model is an over-approximation of the
concrete one. This argumentation has, however, a prerequisite: there may not be any negative comparisons in
the rules, e.g. that two nonces are not the same, or else the abstract model would not be an over-approximation
of the concrete one.
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Fig. 7. NSL (without key-server) under a simple data abstraction.
We do not discuss the matters of data abstraction here, but we consider protocol models where fresh data
have been abstracted away, and show that under these circumstances we can safely perform the simpliﬁcation
to reachable facts and events models, and moreover, that the reachable facts and the reachable events models
are then equivalent in the sense we have deﬁned before. As an example how an abstract model of NSL can look
like, consider the data abstraction displayed in Fig. 7: the nonces created by role A are replaced by na (A,B) in
the rules for A and the fresh nonces created by role B are replaced by nb (B,A) in the rules for B, where na and
nb are new binary function symbols. Observe that the abstraction is only performed on the side of the agent
who creates the nonces, e.g. the nonce NA is only abstracted on A’s side, while B still accepts any value in this
place. As an intuition, one may imagine an agent who does not create fresh nonces all the time, but rather uses
the same nonce in all sessions with a particular agent. Intuitively it should be clear that, if the protocol is safe
under such a behavior of the agents, then it is also safe in case that the agents indeed freshly create the nonces
in each session.
Deﬁnition 1. We say that a protocol is data abstract (or has no fresh data) iff fresh
R
n = ∅ for all roles R and all
even indices 0 < n  last R.
For such a protocol, we can now show the converse direction of the inclusion relation of Theorem 2, namely
that every trace of the message trace model has a counter-part (in terms of intruder knowledge and local agent
states) in the persistent set rewriting model:
Theorem 3. If the protocol is data-abstract, then for all t ∈  there exists a state s ∈  such that DY([t]) = DY(s)
and all agent states represented by t are contained in s :
{stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn ) | [[stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn )]] ⊆ [t] ∧ inst R(mR0 )} ⊆ s .
Proof . This proof uses induction over the inductive deﬁnition of .
Induction Basis. Consider the empty trace <>∈ . Its intruder knowledge is DY(IK0), it has no fresh data.
Moreover, since there are no send and receive events in the empty trace, the following holds:
{stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn ) | [[stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn )]] ⊆ [t] ∧ inst R(mR0 )}
= {stateR(mR0 ) | inst R(mR0 )}
Here, it is crucial that the set of allm, for which inst R(m) holds, is ﬁnite, otherwise we could not reach—in ﬁnitely
many steps—a state of the model that corresponds to the empty trace. (And a similar problem would arise in
the induction step below.) For ﬁnitely many such m, however, a straightforward induction proof shows that we
can reach a state s from the initial state s0 of , which contains all required state facts, using the initialization
rules of themodel. It holds thatDY(s) = DY(s0) = DY(IK0), and there are no fresh data used in s. Therefore,
s corresponds to the empty trace in the sense of the induction hypothesis.
Induction Step. Given any trace t ∈ , for which we already have a corresponding state s ∈  in the sense of
the induction hypothesis. We now show that for every extension t′ of t that we can obtain by using a rule of ,
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we can ﬁnd a state s′ ∈  that can be reached from s in ﬁnitely many steps of the model and that also satisﬁes
the induction hypothesis with respect to t′.
Let states (t) = {stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn ) | [[stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn )]] ⊆ [t] ∧ inst R(mR0 )}denote the set of state
facts associated with a trace t. First observe that, even though t′ is an extension of t with just one event,
states (t′) \ states (t) can contain more than one state fact. In other words, a single event in the  model may
correspond to multiple steps of the  model.
We ﬁrst show that states (t) is ﬁnite for every trace t ∈  (otherwise we would be unable to reach a corre-
sponding state of  in ﬁnitely many steps). This can be shown by a simple inductive proof: the empty trace has
a ﬁnite corresponding set of states as seen above, and with every extension t′ of a trace t by one event, the set
remains also ﬁnite, as in the worst case this new event can induce a ﬁnite number of new state facts for every
state fact of states (t).
Next, we remark amonotonicity property of [[·]] in theway a state fact “grows”, namely [[stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn )
]] ⊇ [[stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn−2)]] for all even0 < n  last
R
. Thus, thenew facts {f1, . . . , fn} = states (t′) \ states (t)
can be ordered such that each fi is an extension of a state fact in states (t) ∪ {f1, . . . , fi−1}.
We now show by an “inner” induction that we can construct a sequence s = s0 ⇒∗ s1 ⇒∗ . . . ⇒∗ sn = s′
of reachable states of , such that for some sets of messages IK i ⊆ DY([t′]) with IK i+1 ⊇ IK i it holds that
si = s ∪ {f1, . . . , fi} ∪ {iknows (m) | m ∈ IK i}.
• Inner Induction Basis: for s0 (and IK0 = ∅) nothing is to show.• Inner Induction Step: Suppose we have already shown reachability of si with the above conditions and a
respective IK i . We showwe can then reach si+1 for some IK i+1 ⊇ IK i . The state fact fi+1, for which we have to
showaway to reach it,must have the form stateR(mR0 , . . . ,m
R
n ) for some substitution (due to the deﬁnition
of [[·]]) and some even nwith 0 < n  last R. Also, by the inner induction hypothesis, stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn−2)
is already contained in si . We thus have to show that the intruder can construct the message mRn−1, so
we can apply the appropriate transition rule of . The respective receive event, namely rcva(m
R
n−1) for
a = player (mR0 ) is present in t already (otherwise the extension to t′ were impossible in ). Therefore,
mRn−1 ∈ DY([t]) = DY(s), by the outer induction hypothesis. Thus, we can obtain the fact iknows (mRn−1)
by ﬁnitely many applications of intruder deduction rules on si , i.e. there is a state s′i with si →∗ s′i ∈  and
s′i = si ∪ {iknows (m) | m ∈ IK ′i} for some set IK i ⊆ IK ′i ⊆ DY([t]). We can now ﬁnally apply the transition
rule to s′iwhichgivesus si+1 = s′i ∪ {stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn ), iknows (mRn )}.Deﬁne IK i+1 = IK
′
i ∪ {mRn }. Then
si+1 and IK i+1 satisfy the inner induction hypothesis: IK i+1 ⊆ DY([t′]), further si+1 is reachable in ﬁnitely
many steps from si , and si+1 = si ∪ {fi+1} ∪ {iknows (m) | m ∈ IK i+1}.
From the inner induction proof, we can now show that the outer induction hypothesis holds for t′ and s′:
DY(s′) = DY(s ∪ IKn) = DY([t′]) and states (t′) ⊆ s′. 
Combining Theorems 2 and 3, the persistent set rewriting model and the inductive trace model are thus
“equivalent” (in a certain sense) for protocols under data abstraction.
We now come back to the idea of a reachable facts model and formally investigate the relationship between
the persistent set rewriting model to the reachable facts model. The over-approximation relationship directly
follows from the deﬁnition, in the sense that every fact of a reachable state is present in . What we prove now is
that the reachable facts model does not “merge too many facts”, in the sense that every subset of the reachable
facts is contained in some reachable state of the persistent set rewriting model. The following Theorem states
this and an analogous statement for the reachable events and message traces models:
Theorem 4. If the protocol has no fresh data, then for every ﬁnite set of reachable facts F ⊆ , there is a reachable
state S ∈  such that F ⊆ S. Similarly, for every ﬁnite set of reachable events E ⊆ , there is a trace t ∈  such
that E ⊆ [t].
Proof . Reachable states and facts. Given a ﬁnite set F = {f1, . . . , fn} ⊆ , then by deﬁnition of , for each fi
there is a state Si ∈ , such that fi ∈ Si . Thus, it is sufﬁcient to show that for any reachable states S1, S2 ∈ ,
their union S1 ∪ S2 ∈  is reachable. Then, the proposition follows by inductively applying this argument to
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all Si for each fi . Let S1, S2 ∈ , and let S0 ∈  be the initial state of the persistent set rewriting model. Then
S0 ⊆ S1 and S0 ⊆ S2, as the rewriting is persistent. Since no fresh data are created, the same rules under the same
substitutions can be applied to S1 as to S0. Therefore, we can add the missing facts from S2 to S1, i.e. S1 ∪ S2 ∈ .
Reachable traces and events. The argument is similar (with [·] applied to the traces). 
We conclude this section with a consequence of all previous Theorems, namely that for protocols under data
abstraction, the reachable facts and reachable events models also coincide:
Theorem 5. Consider a data-abstract protocol. Then DY() = DY(), and stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn ) ∈  iff
inst R(mR0 ) and [[stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn )]] ⊆ .
Proof . DY() Def . = DY(∪s∈s) Th.2 & Th.3= DY(∪t∈[t]) Def . = DY().
Let stateR(mR0 , . . . ,m
R
n ) ∈ . Then inst R(mR0 ), and there is a state s ∈ with stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn ) ∈ s. By
Theorem 2, there is a trace t ∈ , such that [[stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn )]] ⊆ [t]. Thus [[stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn )]] ⊆  .
Let [[stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn )]] ⊆  and inst R(mR0 ). Then by Theorem 4, there is a trace t ∈  such that[[stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn )]] ⊆ [t]. By Theorem 3, there is a reachable state s ∈ , such that stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRn ) ∈
s. It follows that stateR(mR0 , . . . ,m
R
n ) ∈ . 
This concludes the exposition of the relationship between the persistent rewriting model and the message
trace model: if we have no fresh data in messages, we can move to a reachable facts and reachable events model,
respectively, without any loss of generality.
Several abstract veriﬁcation approaches, e.g. [9,12,13], go yet a step further in the approximation and consider
only “reachable messages”, i.e. messages that the intruder can deduce in any reachable state. As this kind of
model is very close to the reachable facts and reachable events models and shares the most important properties
with them, we do not further discuss this variant.
6. Goals
We have so far not considered the question of how to describe, in the different models, the properties that a
protocol is supposed to ensure, or conversely, what states or traces would count as attacks on the protocol. Based
on the results from the previous sections, namely the correspondence between local states of honest agents on
the one side, and receive and send events on the other side, we now investigate how one can formalize standard
goals in the different models.
6.1. Secrecy
We ﬁrst consider secrecy goals which are straight-forward to handle: we can apply Theorems 1–5 to show
that, for instance, if the intruder can ﬁnd out a secret in a reachable state of , then there is a trace of  in
which the intruder has also found out that secret. In other words, a secrecy ﬂaw of a protocol in the standard
set rewriting model implies that this ﬂaw also exists in the more abstract models.
For the message pattern speciﬁcation, we specify a secrecy goal by means of a role R, a subterm of a mes-
sage pattern of R and a set of protocol variables (the latter representing the principals who may know it). For
instance, in the example of NSL, we could specify for A, that both the subterms NA and NB of A are secrets
shared between the principals instantiating the protocol variables A and B of A. (And one can specify similar
goals from B’s point of view.)
In the set rewriting model, a violation of secrecy is thus deﬁned as a state in which the intruder knows a
message that is supposed to be secret between a set of agents that he does not belong to. More concretely, for
the NSL example, an attack state for secrecy of NB from A’s point of view is thus formulated as follows:
∃s ∈ . ∃(dom() = vars(A)).
stateA((A,B), . . . , {NA,A}PKB, . . . , {NA,NB,A}pk(A), {NB}PKB) ∈ s∧
A /= i ∧ B /= i ∧ NB ∈ DY(s)
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Here, we have existentially quantiﬁed over a substitution of all protocol variables of A (where (dom() = V)
expresses the restriction that  is a substitution with domain V ).
More generally, for each of the different models, we now deﬁne a predicate that deﬁnes what a violation of a
secrecy goal means. The particular secrecy goal is speciﬁed by a triple (R,M , {A1, . . . ,An}) where R is a role, M
is a subterm of one of R’s message patterns (i.e. mR0 , . . . ,mRlastR ), and each Ai is a variable that appears in these
message patterns. Intuitively, it means that every message that instantiates M in a concrete run of the protocol
of R must be kept secret between the agents instantiating the variables {A1, . . . ,An}; in particular, the intruder
may not ﬁnd out the instantiation ofM unless he is one of the Ai . The formal deﬁnition for the different models
is as follows:
secrecyFlaw(R,M , {A1, . . . ,An}) = ∃s ∈ .∃.
stateR(mR0 , . . . ,m
R
last
R) ∈ s ∧ i /∈ {A1, . . . ,An} ∧M ∈ DY(s)
secrecyFlaw(R,M , {A1, . . . ,An}) = ∃s ∈ .∃.
stateR(mR0 , . . . ,m
R
last
R) ∈ s ∧ i /∈ {A1, . . . ,An} ∧M ∈ DY(s)
secrecyFlaw(R,M , {A1, . . . ,An}) = ∃t ∈ .∃.
[[stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRlastR)]] ⊆ [t] ∧ i /∈ {A1, . . . ,An} ∧M ∈ DY([t])
secrecyFlaw(R,M , {A1, . . . ,An}) = ∃.
stateR(mR0 , . . . ,m
R
last
R) ∈  ∧ i /∈ {A1, . . . ,An} ∧M ∈ DY()
secrecyFlaw(R,M , {A1, . . . ,An}) = ∃.
[[stateR(mR0 , . . . ,mRlastR)]] ⊆  ∧ i /∈ {A1, . . . ,An} ∧M ∈ DY()
Note that in this deﬁnition we use the relationships between the different models that we have established so far,
in particular, we use the [[·]] function to “translate” the agent state facts into the models that talk about events
instead.
The following Theorem tells us that the over-approximations are safe in the sense that if the more precise
models have an attack on secrecy, then also the approximated models have an attack on secrecy:
Theorem 6.For every protocolwith data abstraction and secrecygoalG, secrecyFlaw(G) implies secrecyFlaw(G),
secrecyFlaw(G), secrecyFlaw(G), and secrecyFlaw(G).
Proof .The proof is immediate fromTheorems 1–5.We just show that secrecyFlaw(G) implies secrecyFlaw(G),
the other implications are similar. Suppose that secrecyFlaw(G) holds; then there is a state s ∈  and a substi-
tution  such that stateR(mR0 , . . . ,m
R
last
R) ∈ s,M ∈ DY(s) and i /∈ {A1, . . . ,An}. By Thereom 1, we thus have
that the same state and iknows facts are contained in some reachable state s′ ∈  of the persistent set rewriting
model, in particular i /∈ {A1, . . . ,An}. Therefore, this s′ is an attack state according to secrecyFlaw(G). This
shows that secrecyFlaw(G) implies secrecyFlaw(G). 
As a ﬁnal remark on secrecy goals, one can use the data abstraction for a simpler formulation of secrecy
goals in the  and  models. For instance, in the given example, we may specify that the following is an attack:
the intruder learns na (A,B) or nb (B,A) unless A = i or B = i.
6.2. Authentication
We will now consider how to formalize authentication goals in the considered models and prove that the
over-approximation relation is sound with respect to these goals, as we have done for secrecy above. We focus
on a particular notion of authentication that is known as non-injective agreement [22]. In this sense, the statement
“A authenticates B onM” intuitively means the following. Whenever an agent A in role A ﬁnishes the protocol,
seemingly talking to an agent B in role B with a particular value for the message M , then at some point in the
past there was indeed an agent Bwho had the same values for A, B, andM in his local state.M is not necessarily a
(sub-) message of the protocol itself, but may be composed by the agents from parts of the transmitted message.
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Fig. 8. An example protocol that highlights a difference between the models  and  () models. The trace on the bottom left part has
several counter-parts in the  model, one of which is the one in the bottom right part where a and b end up in different states.
Note also that in this version of authentication, a pure replay of messages does not count as an attack as it would
in the notion of injective agreement [22] which we do not consider in this paper. There are several alternative
notions of authentication and different ways of formalizing them, e.g. based on rank functions as in [26], that
will however not be considered here.
When formalizing authentication goals for the different models and trying to prove a similar relationship
as Theorem 6, we discovered a subtle difference between the set rewriting model  (or ) and the trace
model . Fig. 8 shows a trivial, bad protocol and a trace of send and receive events that the  model per-
mits. There are several reachable states in the  (and ) model that correspond to this sequence of events
via the [[·]] function, one of which is also displayed in Fig. 8. The point is that in several parallel sessions,
requests from A and acknowledgments from B may be associated in a different way by the agents, e.g. in
the example, A might associate the response n3 from B with her ﬁrst request n1, while B has received only
A’s second request n2. For the authentication goal “A authenticates B on (NA,NB)”, i.e. agreement on the
pair of nonces, this reachable state of the  (and ) model is an attack. In the  model, however, the trace
contains too few information to recognize this as a possible attack, as it is missing the context (i.e. the local
state) in which messages were sent. It is worth to note that we have discovered this problem with authenti-
cation only after formally deﬁning the models and goals, and our failure to prove the claim that  has at
least as many attacks as . Indeed we see this as part of understanding better the models that we are working
with.
Though this example is a bit contrived, it reﬂects a problem that often occurs in parallel sessions when a
bad protocol fails to properly link information to a particular session (e.g. in the example, the acknowledg-
ment message may include the nonce NA to prevent this shortcoming). Since such problems are a common ﬂaw
in authentication protocols, many veriﬁcation approaches are based on annotations of protocols with special
events that reﬂect the context in which a message has been sent (and which the protocol may be missing), e.g.
[1,27,22,28,29]. This also has the advantage that authentication goals can be formulated in a more abstract
way, not referring to the concrete messages of the protocol, but using the special events as an interface to
it.
For the authentication goals, we use two kinds of special events. The ﬁrst, witness (A,B,C ,D), represents that
an agent A intends to execute the protocol with agent B and data D; the parameter C is used to distinguish
different purposes for which the data was meant by the creator. The second kind of event, request (B,A,C ,D),
represents the counter-part, namely that B has ﬁnished his part of the protocol and now believes that there is
an agent A who meant to execute the protocol with B and using the message D for purpose C . These events are
part of the model and inaccessible to the intruder, i.e. he cannot read their contents or create them himself. As
these events contain all relevant information, we can formulate the authentication goals without referring to
the exchanged messages.
In the example of Fig. 8, in order to state the goal “A authenticates B on (NA,NB)”, B generates the event
witness (B,A, NA_NB, (NA,NB))when sending the acknowledgment (where B and A are replaced with the respec-
tive agent names, NA and NB are replaced with the concrete nonces, and NA_NB is a new constant to identify the
purpose). Similarly, A generates the event request (A,B, NA_NB, (NA,NB)) on receiving the acknowledgment.
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Fig. 9. NSL (without key-server) augmented with the special events for the authentication goals.
In general, we consider a state (trace) as an attack state (trace), if it contains request (B,A,C ,D) (where A /= i
and B /= i), but does not also contain the corresponding witness (A,B,C ,D). For the example of Fig. 8, both the
,  and  models now have an attack.
To easily integrate the new kinds of events into , , and  without changing the models and such that we
can reuse the Theorems proved about them, we make these events part of the exchanged messages. To that end,
let witness (·) and request (·) be two function symbols of  that are used merely for this purpose. Further, there
are no intruder deduction rules for the symbols witness (·) and request (·), i.e. the intruder can neither “decrypt”
such a “message”, nor construct one himself. Fig. 9 shows how the witness (·) and request (·) facts can be added
to the messages of the protocol itself, appearing only in the message patterns of the role that creates the event.
NA and NB are constants used here to identify the purpose of the exchanged nonces in the protocol.
Using the new events, we can now formulate (non-injective) authentication for the models  and  in a
protocol-independent way:
authFlaw = ∃s ∈ . ∃A,B,C ,D ∈ T. A /= i ∧ B /= i∧
request (B,A,C ,D) ∈ DY(s) ∧ witness (A,B,C ,D) /∈ DY(s)
authFlaw = ∃t ∈ . ∃A,B,C ,D ∈ T. A /= i ∧ B /= i∧
request (B,A,C ,D) ∈ DY([t]) ∧ witness (A,B,C ,D) /∈ DY([t])
The formulation for  is identical to the one for , except that s ∈ . We conclude that all authentication ﬂaws
of the  model can also be found in the  and  model:
Theorem 7.
(1) authFlaw implies authFlaw, and
(2) authFlaw implies authFlaw.
Proof .
(1) Let s ∈  be an attack state that satisﬁes authFlaw. By Theorem 1, there is a state s′ ∈  with s′ ⊇ s and
DY(s′) = DY(s). Since both states have the same intruder knowledge, they in particular contain the same
witness (·) and request (·) facts. Thus s′ is an attack state, and authFlaw holds.
(2) Let s ∈  be an attack state that satisﬁes authFlaw. By Theorem 2, there is a trace t ∈ , such that
DY(s) = DY([t]). Again, since [t] has the same intruder knowledge as s, it contains the same witness (·)
and request (·) facts, thus [t] is an attack trace and authFlaw holds. 
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6.3. Authentication in the reachable facts/events models
In the reachable facts and events models, the formulation of authentication goals is more difﬁcult. The reason
is that in these models all states (or all traces) are merged into one. Suppose there is a reachable attack state
s ∈ , i.e. there are certain facts f1 and f2, such that f1 ∈ s and f2 /∈ s. If there is a reachable state s′ ∈  such
that f2 ∈ s′, then f1, f2 ∈ , and the attack predicate fails on . Note that Theorem 4 guarantees for this case
only that there is a state s ∈  such that f1, f2 ∈ s, i.e. that these facts are not exclusive on all states.
We thus need different ways to formulate authentication goals in the reachable facts and event models. When
data abstraction is performed, i.e. when the protocol has no fresh data anymore, then we can exploit the way
the abstract terms that replace the fresh data are generated. As an example, consider again the NSL example,
the goal that A authenticates B on NB, and the data abstraction nb (B,A) as the nonce created by B for A. Then
this authentication goal can be expressed as follows:
∃A,B,D ∈ T. A /= i ∧ B /= i ∧ request (A,B, NB,D) ∈ DY() ∧ D /= nb (B,A)
This goal states that it is an authentication ﬂaw if A ﬁnishes the protocol with any value other than nb (B,A) for
the nonce fromB, unlessB = i. Intuitively, the form nb (B,A) of nonceNB can be seen similarly to awitness-event:
NB has this form iff it has been created by B for A for the purpose of NB. The construction of the abstract data
thus allows us to declaratively see who created the data for whom and for what purpose. Put another way, for
a given request term request (A,B,C ,D) of the NSL example, the data-abstraction allows us to decide if D is
indeed a valid term with respect to A, B, and C . In particular, a term nb (B,A) can only be generated by B for
A and for purpose nb . It is therefore guaranteed that any state of  and  or trace of  also contains the term
witness (A,B, NB, nb (A,B)).
To formalize this idea independent of the concrete protocol and abstraction, we will now assume that, along
with the protocol description, a predicate wellformed (A,B,C ,D) is provided that has the following property:
if wellformed (A,B,C ,D) holds and D occurs in a reachable state s ∈ ,
then witness (A,B,C ,D) ∈ DY(s) . (1)
The deﬁnition of property (1) is based on the reachable states of the  model, as this is the reference model to
which we want to compare the deﬁnition of authentication for  and  in Theorem 8.
For theNSL example in the considered data abstraction, we can deﬁne thewellformed (·) predicate as follows:
wellformed (A,B, NA, na (A,B)) and wellformed (B,A, NB, nb (B,A))
is true for all agent names A and B, and wellformed (·) is false otherwise. It is immediate that this predicate
satisﬁes property (1), since whenever a term of the forms na (A,B) or nb (B,A) is generated in a reachable state,
also a corresponding witness fact is produced.
Note that, if one provides a predicate wellformed (A,B,C ,D) that is too restrictive, in the sense that it is false
for arguments A,B,C , and D for which witness terms exist in some reachable states of , then the deﬁnition of
authentication ﬂaws below may produce false positives (i.e. meaningless attacks, even if the protocol is safe).
This is the general problem of over-approximation. However, we will obtain useful results in this case only if
the data abstraction is ﬁne enough to allow for a reasonable deﬁnition of the predicate wellformed (A,B,C ,D),
namely when it carries at least the information about who created the term for whom and for what purpose.
We will consider an example of an even ﬁner abstraction below.
Based on the wellformed (·) predicate, we deﬁne authentication goals for the reachable facts model as follows:
authFlaw = ∃A,B,C ,D ∈ T.
request (B,A,C ,D) ∈ DY() ∧ ¬wellformed (A,B,C ,D)
The formulation for the reachable events model is identical except for replacing  with . Finally, we can show
that also the reachable facts and events models are complete for the checking of authentication goals in this
formulation:
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Theorem 8. For a data abstract protocol with a given predicate wellformed (·) that satisﬁes property (1), authFlaw
implies authFlaw and authFlaw.
Proof . Let s ∈  be an attack state according to authFlaw, i.e. we have request (B,A,C ,D) ∈ DY(s) for some
terms A, B, C , andD, where A /= i and B /= i, and such that witness (A,B,C ,D) /∈ DY(s). SinceD occurs in s, from
property (1) follows that wellformed (A,B,C ,D) does not hold (otherwise witness (A,B,C ,D) ∈ DY(s)). By Theo-
rem 4, we know that there is a subset s′ ⊆  of the reachable facts, with s ⊆ s′, with request (B,A,C ,D) ∈ DY(s′).
Recall that A /= i, B /= i, and wellformed (A,B,C ,D) does not hold. Thus authFlaw holds. This shows that
authFlaw implies authFlaw. It is immediate from Theorem 5 that authFlaw implies authFlaw, as DY() =
DY(). 
We conclude the goals section with the remark that, for authentication goals, the data abstraction we have
used as an example for the NSL protocol is too coarse. Consider a normal execution of NSL after which the
intruder does the following:
1.′ i → b : {N , a}pk(b)
2.′ b → i : {N , nb (b, a), b}pk(a)
3.′ i → b : {nb (b, a)}pk(b)
where the intruder knows the message 3′ from the previous normal execution of the protocol, and N is any
number created by the intruder. This violates authFlaw and authFlaw, while NSL is ﬂawless in the other mod-
els—this attack is thus a false positive. To overcome such false positives, ﬁner abstractions must be chosen, for
instance using the following abstraction for NB:
nb (B,A,NA) .
This means that the nonces NB created by role B are a function of not only the agent names but additionally of
the incoming nonce NA. Therefore, the abstraction distinguishes between nonces NB that were created by B in
response to different incoming nonces. The above false attack does not work anymore with this ﬁner abstrac-
tion, since the nonce of step 2′ is then nb (b, a,N) and the intruder cannot produce the ﬁnal message 3′ with this
nonce. In fact, using the ﬁner abstraction, there are no more ﬂaws in the  and models of NSL. Therefore, the
ﬁner abstraction allows us to verify NSL, while the ﬁrst, coarser abstraction prevents the veriﬁcation by false
positives.
The problem of false positives and reﬁnement of abstraction raises the question, how to determine “appro-
priate” abstractions (as an unnecessary ﬁne abstraction can make automated veriﬁcation infeasible). A general
approach used in abstraction-basedmodel-checking for this problem is the technique of counter-example guided
abstraction reﬁnement [30], which consists of starting with a coarse abstraction and reﬁning it, whenever a ﬂaw
(counter-example) is found, based on the properties of this counter-example. These procedures are based on
heuristics to reﬁne the abstraction in an appropriate way; in general, these techniques may fail to verify a correct
system as they can run into an inﬁnite loop of reﬁnements. However, well-chosen heuristics for the given domain
allow the automated veriﬁcation for a large class of veriﬁcation problems, e.g. [11, 16] in protocol veriﬁcation.
7. Conclusions
The focus of this paper is conceptual, concerned with the questions of modeling protocols and comparing
such models, while we have not considered particular techniques to automatically verify protocols. We there-
fore do not report on any experimental results here, however we point out that there exists a wide variety of
empirically successful analysis techniques based on the models presented in this paper [8,9,10,11, 12,13,14,4,1].
We have formally proved equivalence and over-approximation relationships between several protocol mod-
els. As a representative of standard protocol models, we have used the set rewriting model . We showed that it
is an over-approximation of the message trace model  in a certain sense. For a more precise account we have
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deﬁned a persistent variant  of the set rewriting model. Showing that this variant lies strictly between  and 
demonstrates that the model incorporates two different kinds of over-approximation: The ﬁrst kind abstracts
from a large part of the control structure, namely that agents can react again and again to partial runs of the
protocol. The second kind abstracts away the context in which messages have been said.
We then considered a further kind of control abstraction, basically turning from reachable states (traces) to
reachable facts  (events ). We show that these models, which are often used in the context of data abstraction,
are themselves over-approximations of  and .
We then turned to the question how to deﬁne security goals in these models. For secrecy goals, it is straight-
forward that the over-approximation is appropriate in the sense that any attack against secrecy in the model
can be recast in the , , , and  models. Thus, when we verify in one of these over-approximated models
that a protocol achieves its secrecy goal, then this also holds in the original model. It turns out that the over-
approximation is not appropriate in this sense for checking authentication goals formulated over exchanged
messages in general: we gave an example of a protocol and authentication goal that is violated according to the
model, while the same protocol and goal appear ﬂawless in the  model. However, when using auxiliary events
to formulate authentication, as it is done in a number of recent approaches, the over-approximation indeed
works. More precisely, we can show that veriﬁcation of authentication goals in model implies the veriﬁcation
in the  model. Finally, we have shown how to formulate authentication for the models  and  using the data
abstraction.
We see the main contribution of this paper as giving a precise account of several widely used models and
their relationships. This formalization gives us the ability to recognize such subtle problems as the one about
authentication goals, and to give a provenly correct reformulation.
Besides a better understanding of the employed models, these results also pave the way for combining meth-
ods based on these models, in particular, connecting automated veriﬁcation procedures with a formalization
in the theorem prover Isabelle in the style of [4]. Such a connection is motivated by the fact that a protocol
veriﬁcation tool may have bugs which can potentially lead to the “veriﬁcation” of a ﬂawed protocol by that
tool, while the chance that a wrong security proof is accepted by Isabelle is much smaller. (Left aside mistakes
and abstractions in the formalization itself.) The results of this work give an idea how such a connection may be
possible, namely that the proof object generated by an automated veriﬁcation tool is based on an invariant on
the set of messages that can ever be sent by an honest agent, and the messages the intruder can derive. We have
begun with a case-study of generating proofs in Isabelle from the output of a abstraction-based veriﬁcation tool.
While the connection at the current stage of the tools requires manual work, we are conﬁdent that this can be
done completely automatically in future versions.
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